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The Probability of Sale and Price Premiums in Withdrawn 
Auctioned Properties 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the impact of the auction process of residential properties that 
whilst unsuccessful at auction sold subsequently. The empirical analysis considers 
both the probability of sale and the premium of the subsequent sale price over the 
guide price, reserve and opening bid. The findings highlight that the final achieved 
sale price is influenced by key price variables revealed both prior to and during the 
auction itself. Factors such as auction participation, the number of individual bidders 
and the number of bids are significant in a number of the alternative specifications.  
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The Probability of Sale and Price Premiums in Withdrawn 
Auctioned Properties 
 
1: Introduction 
The last three decades have seen a large number of papers to have considered the 
theoretical constructs of auctions. This literature has considered a wide range of issues 
such as alternative auction methods; the preference of auction versus negotiated sales 
in terms of expected revenue; risk aversion from the perspective of both sellers and 
bidders; the probability of sale; the impact of the number of bidders; the nature of the 
information in particular the issue of common and private information and the 
importance of reserve prices. However, relatively few papers have empirically 
considered the impact of the auction process on the subsequent sale of assets that did 
not meet the reserve price, i.e. properties that were withdrawn at auction and sold 
subsequent to the event.  In a residential property context, two key exceptions are 
Ashenfelter & Genesove (1992) and Ong (2006).  Ashenfelter & Genesove (1992) 
found evidence that successful auction sales achieved an average premium of 13% 
over those properties initially offered at auction, withdrawn, and then subsequently 
sold.  Ong (2006) extends this analysis to find that issues such as the attendance at the 
auction and whether no bids were submitted at auction have a positive and negative 
impact respectively on the probability of sale.  
 
However, these papers, as with many in the broad auction literature have been 
constrained by the availability of data, indeed it remains one of the most common 
challenges in the field. This paper considers the residential auction market in Dublin, 
Ireland and specifically examines the dynamics of properties unsuccessfully offered 
for sale through auction. The dataset utilised in the paper includes information often 
missing from empirical auction research, including; the undisclosed reserve, 
attendance at the auction and the number of bids and bidders. A key advantage 
through the use of this data is that we do not have to rely on proxies to capture the 
impact of different factors. A further consideration in the examination of the Irish 
market is that auctions were an extremely popular form of sale mechanism during the 
boom period. The sample period covered in this paper is 1998 through 2002 and so 
allows an examination of a distinct period when auctions were frequently utilised, 
especially at the premium end of the market. The remainder of the paper is set out as 
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follows.  The next section briefly outlines the process for auction sales in the Republic 
of Ireland. Section 3 considers the existing empirical work examining housing 
auctions while Section 4 provides information on the dataset and the methodological 
framework adopted. Section 5 presents the empirical results and concluding 
comments are made in the final section. 
 
2: Auction Process in Ireland 
Residential properties in Ireland that were sold through auction are done so using the 
first-price English open-outcry method. In determining the sale mechanism utilised, 
this decision was made by the vendor in association with the estate agent prior to the 
marketing of the property. This decision process is made easier in the Irish context 
because the agents involved with both sale forms are the same firms.  The result is 
that if an auction sale method is decided upon, the agency concerned acts as the 
auctioneer for the sale. As Stevenson et al. (2010) illustrated, auctions tended to be 
used at the premium end of the market in Ireland, in common with markets like 
Australia (Lusht, 1996) and New Zealand (Doutzour et al., 1998). This finding is in 
contrast to markets such as the United States (DeBoer et al., 1992; Mayer, 1998 and 
McAfee at al. 2002) and Singapore (Ong et al., 2005, Ong 2006) where a large 
proportion of auctioned properties are distressed sales. This obviously leads to 
differences in terms of the motivation of the sellers concerned and is of particular 
importance in terms of the reserve estimates. As this sample consists of willing 
sellers, the reserve prices act as an estimate of market value for the property. This is in 
sharp contrast to previous studies where the reserve price is often a measure of 
outstanding mortgage debt or unpaid taxes (DeBoer et al., 1992; McAfee et al., 
2002)1. 
 
Auction sales in Ireland generally follow a standard process. A three to four week 
marketing period will take place prior to the auction. This period is important to the 
auction is it will allow them to gauge potential demand for the property prior to the 
auction. As part of the marketing material a guide price will generally be provided. It 
is important to note that the guide price is neither a binding commitment on the part of 
the vendor or agent, nor is it the reserve price. The advertised guide price is rather a 
publicly available estimate of the property’s value and is effectively a component of 
the marketing process. Stevenson et al. (2010) argue that guide prices for auction 
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sales in Ireland are underpriced, hypothesizing that this may be due to auctioneers 
attempting to encourage bidders and participation in the auction. Their analysis, using 
a sample from the Dublin market, finds that whereas properties sold through auction 
did so at a significant premium to private treaty sales, the advertised guide prices for 
auctioned properties was significantly lower than for private treaty sales.  
 
The reserve price for an auctioned property will be agreed on the day of the auction 
by the vendor in association with the auctioneer.  The marketing period will have 
helped the agent in gauging potential demand and aided in the advice they provide to 
vendors with respect to an appropriate reserve.  The reserve set before the auction is 
the minimum acceptable price which the vendor will consider.  The reserve is not 
made public either prior to the auction or necessarily during the auction itself. This is 
in contrast with property auctions in other countries, such as Australia, where the 
reserve is made public (Lusht, 1994, 1996).  The only point during the auction process 
when the reserve may be revealed is during the auction where it is common for the 
auctioneer to declare that the property is ‘on-the-market’. Whilst it is not a legal 
requirement, in the majority of cases in our sample the auctioneer did so at some point 
after bidding had exceeded the reserve price. As is the case in most English open-
outcry auctions, as the reserve is the minimum acceptable price which the vendor will 
consider, if it is not achieved the vendor has the option of withdrawing the property 
from the market. It is these properties that this paper pays particular attention to. The 
custom in Ireland is that the right of first negotiation lies with the highest unsuccessful 
bidder. However, as the analysis in the paper will illustrate, in a large number of cases 
the property was not sold immediately following the auction. 
 
A major distinction between private treaty and auction sales in Ireland is the role of 
the initial deposit and the closing process.  Whilst transaction costs, commissions and 
other agency fees are identical in the case of private treaty and auction sales in 
Ireland, for private treaty sales the initial deposit is refundable up until the point that 
initial contracts are signed, a period generally 4 to 6 weeks following the initial 
agreement on price.  In the case of auctions, sales contracts are signed on the day of 
the auction and the successful bidder will be required to sign initial contracts and 
place a 10% non-refundable deposit before the close of business on the auction day.  
Furthermore, the successful bidder at auction is required to close the property sale 
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within 6 weeks of the date of the auction. This not only means that there is an 
immediate financial cost for successful bidders, but also it is imperative that serious 
bidders have financing arrangements and any property inspections completed prior to 
the auction due to the non-refundable nature of the 10% deposit.  
 
3: Auction Literature and Housing Assets 
Whilst there is a relatively large number of papers to have considered auctions in a 
real estate context the majority have concentrated their focus upon the broad issue of 
whether auctions or private treaty negotiations are the preferred sales mechanism. In 
part due to the difficulty in obtaining sufficiently in-depth data, empirical work on 
other issues has been relatively limited. With respect to those papers that have 
considered the broad sale mechanism issue, the evidence presented has been very 
mixed, particularly when considering results across different markets. The contrast in 
results obtained is of interest in the context of the broad auction literature. For 
example, papers such as Wilson (1977) and Milgrom (1989) argue that for goods that 
are of high quality, are not standardized and where the market clearing price is 
unstable, then auctions will be preferred over negotiated sales. Furthermore, when 
goods are heterogeneous then prices will also display greater uncertainty (Milgrom, 
1989 and Bulow & Klemperer, 1996). In the case of English auctions with no reserve 
prices, Bulow & Klemperer (1996) show that a simple competitive auction with one 
additional bidder will result in higher revenue in comparison to an optimally 
structured negotiated sale that has one less bidder. They thus argue that the benefit of 
having additional bidders is greater than the value of negotiating skill. Even in the 
case where the cost of auctioning an asset may be high, auctions may be the preferred 
route. Wang (1993) argues that if the marginal revenue curve associated with the 
valuation the bidder attaches to the asset is sufficiently steep then auctions will be the 
optimal sale mechanism2. 
 
Despite this evidence, a large proportion of the empirical literature to have examined 
housing markets has provided evidence that properties sold through auction sell at a 
discount in comparison to private treaty sales. This is certainly true from the majority 
of studies to have considered the United Sates (e.g. Mayer, 1995, 1998; Allen & 
Swisher, 2000). Mayer (1995) argues that as vendors selling privately are not time 
constrained they can wait longer in order to find a buyer more matched in terms of 
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price. This is a similar argument to that presented in Adams et al. (1992) albeit in the 
context of slow Dutch auctions, and one that Mayer (1995) refers to as the Cost of 
Liquidity. In the context of auctions, there is a greater risk of mismatch, hence auction 
participants do not bid up the price. Furthermore, Mayer (1995) argues that properties 
that display less heterogeneity have a lower Cost of Mismatch and should therefore 
sell for a lower discount. Likewise, for more heterogeneous properties, they will be 
higher mismatch costs. Ong et al (2005) in their empirical examination of auctions in 
Singapore provide results that support the theoretical constructs of Mayer (1995). 
They find that apartments and condominiums, which can be viewed as being more 
homogeneous in nature than detached or semi-detached houses, have a highly 
probability of sale.  
 
Outside of the United States, however, there is evidence to suggest that an auction 
premium should exist in the context of property auctions.  Studies such as Newell et 
al. (1993) and Lusht (1996) for Australia, Dotzour et al. (1998) in the case of New 
Zealand, and Stevenson et al. (2010) for Ireland have all found evidence indicating 
the presence of an auction premium.  Stevenson et al. (2010) is of particular relevance 
given that it considers sales for the same market as the current paper, Dublin, and over 
a similar time-period, 1997 to 2004.  Based on a sample of 2,657 sales, a significantly 
positive coefficient (0.3157) is reported with respect to auction sales.  Whilst it would 
initially appear that these results contradict Mayer (1995) this is not necessarily so. 
Mayer (1995) acknowledges that his model assumes that a seller cannot adjust the 
price in the face of two bidders willing to pay the guide price. Therefore, in booming 
market where this may more commonly occur, auctions may provide an opportunity 
to maximize revenue as bidders can raise prices in excess of the guide price.  
Additionally, the auction discount would be reduced in circumstances where a greater 
number of bidders attended. This combination of market conditions and increased 
participation is a key element in reducing the cost of mismatch in property auctions.   
 
Mayer (1998) provides empirical evidence on role of market conditions relating to 
property auctions, with discounts ranging from 9% to 21% in the Dallas housing 
market crash of the late 1980’s to lower discounts (0% to 9%) found in the booming 
Los Angeles market of the mid-1980s.  It is important to note that whilst discounts 
were still observed in these cases, they were of a lower magnitude during boom 
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conditions.  In contrast, most of the studies that have reported auction premiums are 
from market samples dominated by rising or stable property markets. Certainly in an 
Irish context, the use of auctions has largely ceased in recent years following the 
collapse of the housing market in 2007.  Mayer (1998) further argues that issues such 
as the media attention that surrounds the use of auctions may also influence these 
findings and encourage a short-term non-sustainable auction premium. Again, there is 
some supporting evidence for this position with regard to those studies providing 
evidence of an auction premium.  Stevenson et al. (2010) report that in their tests for 
selectivity bias the time dummies are increasingly negative, lending support to the 
argument that a fall in popularity of auctions as a sale method later in the sample was 
due partly to relatively weak market conditions in 2001, a fall in the sales rate at 
auction, and growing adverse media attention concerning the high premiums over 
guide prices that auctions were achieving.   
 
With respect to the number of bidders, non-property papers such Saidi & Marsden 
(1992) and Chen et al. (2003), together with those to have directly considered real 
estate such Ching & Fu (2003), Ong et al. (2005), Ong (2006) and Ooi et al. (2006) 
have all provided evidence that the number of bidders significantly impacts, in a 
positive sense, upon either the price obtained or the probability of a sale being 
achieved3. Although in a different context, Gilbert & Klemperer (2000) illustrate that 
it may be more profitable for a seller to ration output, thus selling at a fixed price at a 
level at which demand exceeds supply, rather than selling at a higher price that clears 
the market. The underlying rationale here relates to the idea that the offering of lower 
price acts as an incentive for more buyers to enter the market. In the context of our 
paper this does have a direct relevance; furthermore, it can be tied to the arguments of 
Glower et al. (1998) who note that vendors convey information about their desire to 
sell the property through the listing price that is set. The role of bidders can in some 
respects also be tied to the issue of market conditions, as it is likely that auctions 
undertaken during stronger conditions will see a higher number of potential bidders. 
Goeree & Offerman (2002, 2003) explicitly argue that efficiency and therefore the 
revenue generated, will be higher when more bidders enter the auction4. Mayer (1995) 
argues that a rise in the number of bidders also increases the likelihood of the 
participation of high-value bidders. In an auction context, this could be viewed as 
those with higher private values of the property concerned. The recent work of Chow 
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et al. (2011) also notes this. They argue that auctions will be the preferred sale 
mechanism in a case where bidders with higher valuations participate5.  
 
However, whilst it would appear that market conditions do play a role in the success 
or otherwise of auctions, the differences observed across countries may be due to an 
additional factor, namely the type of properties sold through auction. In Ireland, as in 
countries such as Australia and New Zealand, houses sold through auction generally 
tend to be those at the premium end of the market. In an Irish context this is illustrated 
in Stevenson et al. (2010) with 43.66% of auctions being in the highest decile alone. 
Furthermore, Stevenson et al. (2010) note that a significant auction premium was only 
noted in properties selling in excess of €500,000. Papers such as Wilson (1977) and 
Milgrom (1986) provide a theoretical context for such results, arguing that auctions 
will be preferred in the case of high quality goods and those that are less standardized. 
Higher value properties would be a typical case of such a class of assets. Property 
value and sale mechanism choice can be related to the issue of scarcity. French & 
McCormick (1984) argue that a vendor will opt for a negotiated sale when they can 
either identity the highest potential bidder in advance or when they is reduced 
dispersion in the value, i.e. greater homogeneity. In contrast, where greater 
heterogeneity is observed then auctions may be preferred. In relatively cheaper 
property submarkets there will be increased market activity in terms of the number of 
possible properties on the market, therefore a greater availability of comparable sales 
information. This has two implications. Firstly, that there should be a higher level of 
certainty regarding the true value of the property. Secondly, the increased supply of 
close substitutes means that bidders have greater choice. In contrast, higher value and 
more heterogeneous properties effectively contain a higher degree of private value 
relating to the specific characteristics of the property. Effectively, a scarcity issue 
comes into play6. This could lead to more determined bidding and thus the greater 
efficiency of auctions. A further factor that may also play a role at the higher end of 
the market relates to financing constraints. It may be the case that bidders at the lower 
end of the market are subject to greater constraints in this regard and therefore an 
auction premium is not observed7. 
 
The influence of market conditions may also have an impact in another respect. This 
is concerned with the nature of the bids themselves and the information revealed 
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during the auction process. This is important in the context of our analysis of 
withdrawn properties. Although the auction sale was not successful, information 
concerning bidding and value may be revealed during the auction process. Lusht 
(1996) notes the importance of the auction process when bids are not independent but 
rather affiliated. Lusht (1996) argues that the actual auction process reveals additional 
information that would be otherwise unobserved in the case of pure independent bids. 
It has the effect that a bidder’s private value is influenced by the information revealed 
at the auction in terms of the behaviour of other bidders. It may therefore lead to a 
bidder upwardly revising their valuation. The combination of this use of other 
bidder’s revealed valuations together with the price rule also ensures that there is a 
preference in terms of revenue over sealed bid auctions (Levin et al., 1996). Milgrom 
& Weber (1982) argue that English open outcry auctions will be revenue maximizing 
if bids are affiliated rather than independent in comparison to sealed bids as a high 
valuation assigned by one bidder makes higher valuations by other bidders more 
likely8. Goeree & Offerman (2002, 2003) note that the combination of common and 
private values can lead to inefficiencies. One of the examples that they note is when a 
party with a lower private value then another bidder may still end up purchasing the 
asset/good where they have placed a higher valuation on the common valuation. 
Whether this higher assessment of the common value is realistic or not is irrelevant. 
They argue that auction efficiency will increase, and therefore the vendor’s revenue, 
with increased certainty concerning common values. The argument is based upon the 
premise that uncertainty regarding the common value can, in the limit, override 
bidder’s private information. At the opposite end of the spectrum, if there was no 
uncertainty regarding the common value, then the auction reduces to a pure private 
value auction9. In a broader context Goeree & Offerman (2002, 2003) highlight that in 
practice few auctions can be neatly categorized as displaying solely private or 
common values. In the context of residential property it is clearly the case that bidders 
will take into account both common information (e.g. potential price appreciation) 
and private information (e.g. location and architectural preferences). 
 
4: Data 
The data analysed consists of residential properties located in the Greater Dublin 
metropolitan area that were put forward for sale through at auction during the period 
1998 to 2002. The data was provided by one of the major auctioneer/estate agents in 
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Dublin and consists of all information relating to the property and auction contained 
in their records10.  It is important to highlight market conditions during the sample 
period. The 1998 through 2002 period was characterized by strong housing market 
conditions and rapid price appreciation. As noted previously, studies such as Mayer 
(1995) have illustrated the importance of controlling for market conditions. However, 
in the context of the current study, whilst time dummies are included in the model 
specifications, there is less need to control for varying conditions. However, the 
results obtained do need to be considered solely in the context of strong market 
conditions and may not necessarily transfer to weaker markets. In addition, the 
broader comments of Mayer (1995) with respect to the optimality of auctions versus 
negotiated sales in booming markets needs to be taken into consideration. 
 
In total data on 404 properties is available. The sample includes properties that were 
both successfully sold at auction and those properties that were withdrawn. The 
withdrawn sample effectively includes three types. The first is those properties 
initially marketed as being offered at auction but that were sold privately prior to the 
auction. The second sub-sample consists of those properties that were withdrawn at 
auction and subsequently sold through private treaty negotiations. The final set 
contains properties that did not successfully sell after being withdrawn at auction. It 
should be noted that none of the withdrawn properties were re-auctioned; rather all of 
them were subsequently offered for sale through private treaty. Out of the total sample 
of 404 properties, 198 were successfully sold at auction, 15 were sold prior to the 
auction, and the remaining 191 were withdrawn at auction. Among the 191 withdrawn 
properties, 77 of them subsequently sold by private treaty.  
 
The variables concerning the auction consist of the guide price, the undisclosed 
reserve price where available and the sale price where appropriate. In cases where the 
property was withdrawn and re-advertised for private treaty sale, the revised guide 
price for the property is also noted where available. Undisclosed reserve prices are 
available for 240 of the 404 properties in the sample.  In the remaining cases, the 
reserve was not available due to the property being sold prior to auction, and therefore 
a reserve was not set, or because the information was not recorded in the auction 
book. Data is also available on the number of bids, number of bidders on a particular 
property, the attendance at the auction, and whether multiple auctions were held that 
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day.  
 
In addition to the data directly related to the auction process, information is also 
available for a variety of property specific variables. These include the location of the 
property, the type of property, the date of sale, the availability of parking facilities, the 
number of bedrooms, and the number of bathrooms. Unfortunately reliable floor area 
data was not available, leading to the bedroom and bathroom data having to act as 
proxies for property size. The dummy variables used with respect to location divide 
the properties into the following areas of Greater Dublin: Central City, South City, 
North City, South County and the Periphery of Dublin. Dublin postcodes have even 
numbers in the south of the city and odd numbers in the north which makes a clear 
demarcation of the sample straightforward. The Central City is defined by the 
postcodes D1, D2, D7 and D8. The South City includes all remaining even postcodes 
and the North City all remaining odd numbered postcodes. South County Dublin 
contains all areas within the County of Dublin south of the River Liffey, but not 
formally within the City of Dublin. The remaining areas of the greater metropolitan 
area, including the remaining sections of County Dublin as well as parts of Kildare, 
Louth, Meath and Wicklow are grouped together. The location of properties in the 
sample is dominated by two key submarkets, namely South City and South County 
Dublin, which represent the most highly priced submarkets in Greater Dublin, thus 
confirming that auctions were used primarily at the premium end of the market during 
the period covered in this sample. Out of 404 properties in the overall sample, 161 
properties were located in the South City and a further 133 were located in South 
County Dublin. The sample is fairly evenly spread by property type, with the 
following categories used; detached (110), semi-detached house (96), bungalow (69), 
terrace/mews (104) and apartment (25). Table 1 provides summary statistics for the 
sample.  
 
5: Empirical Analysis 
The first section of the empirical analysis considers whether the final sale mechanism 
impacted upon the price achieved. The broad methodological framework adopted is 
similar to that adopted in many previous papers, such as Lusht (1996), Mayer (1998), 
Ong et al. (2005) and Stevenson et al. (2010). The model used is a standard log 
hedonic model as displayed in Equation (1). 
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ii   X)price saleln(         (1) 
 
X represents the hedonic characteristics of the property. Dummy variables are 
included to indicate whether the property was successfully sold at auction or whether 
it was sold prior with the missing dummy referring to withdrawn properties.  The base 
model then included the number of bathrooms, bedrooms and a dummy indicating 
whether the property had parking facilities. Groups of dummies were included to 
capture the impact of property type, location and the year of sale. The base property 
was one a bungalow, located in North City Dublin that sold in 200011. 
 
The results in Table 2 report a positive coefficient for properties selling at auction; 
however, it is not statistically significant at conventional levels. The interpretation of 
this finding needs to be carefully considered, particularly in the context of the results 
in Stevenson et al. (2010) who found evidence of an auction premium. A key element 
that differentiates these two samples is that Stevenson et al. (2010) examined a sample 
containing both auction and private treaty sales. In contrast, the current sample is 
limited to only those properties that were at least initially put up for sale by auction. 
Therefore, when considering the sold at auction dummy it important to understand 
that this is relative to the sale price achieved by properties withdrawn and 
subsequently sold after going through the auction process. This is an issue that we 
will return to, in that it may be that although the withdrawn properties did not sell at 
auction, their final realised price was influenced by the auction process, hence the 
lack of a significant coefficient in this regard. This is consistent with the arguments 
presented in Lusht (1996) in terms of bidder’s valuations being influenced by the 
information revealed by other bidders in an auction setting. The remaining 
coefficients are generally in line with expectations with significant positive 
coefficients reported with respect to the number of bedrooms and bathrooms, 
detached properties and those located in South City and South County Dublin. In 
terms of the year dummies, they reflect the strong upward movement in the market 
during the sample period with a significant negative coefficient for 1998 and positive 
findings for 2001 and 2002.  
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Table 2 also reports the findings when the log of the guide price is substituted in the 
place of the realized sale price. The results for the majority of the variables are as 
reported when sale prices were considered. It is however with respect to the auction 
dummy that an interesting finding is observed. The properties that were successfully 
sold at auction appear to have been advertised at a significantly lower guide than 
those that did not sell and were withdrawn. Again, the comparison with Stevenson et 
al. (2010) is not as simple as one may initial think as our sample is constrained to 
solely those properties that were advertised as being sold through auction. In this case 
it may be that the guide price plays a more subtle role. The result can be interpreted 
that properties whose relative guide price is lower are more likely to sell. Therefore, 
in that sense the results support the view of Stevenson et al. (2010) in that the guide is 
being used as a marketing tool in order to encourage participation in the auction and 
hence increase the likelihood of a successful sale.  
 
The main empirical results are however directly concerned with the influence of the 
auction process on the prices achieved subsequently for properties that were 
withdrawn. Few papers have considered this, the two primary exceptions in a housing 
context being Ashenfelter and Genesove (1992) and Ong (2006). Our withdrawn 
sample includes a total of 191 properties. Of these 77 were subsequently sold, 114 
remaining unsold. As with the overall sample, property specific characteristic data is 
available, as are the details from the auction itself. The analysis is based upon a probit 
model that considers the probability of sale. The dependent variable is a binary 
variable taking the value of unity if the property was sold post auction and zero 
otherwise. The independent variables include property specific variables, namely; the 
number of bathrooms, bedrooms and a dummy indicating whether the property had 
parking facilities. Groups of dummies were included to capture the impact of property 
type, location and the year of sale. The base property was a bungalow, located in 
North City Dublin, sold in 2000. The auction variables included relate to the 
attendance at the auction, the number of bidders, the number of bids and whether 
multiple auctions were held that day. We also include a variable which takes the value 
of unity if no bids were made at auction and zero otherwise. 
 
The findings from the Binary Probit model are included in Table 3 and take three 
alternative specifications.  In addition to the core property and auction variables these 
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include, in turn, the New Guide-to-Old Guide premium, the New Guide-to-Reserve 
premium and the Reserve Price. None of the variables relating to attendance at 
auction and the number of bids/bidders are significant in this case.  While this is in 
sharp contrast Ong (2006), that sample of Singaporean properties primarily consisted 
of apartments and contained a large number of distressed sales. The resulting more 
homogeneous sample may explain the difference in the findings reported.  However, 
the No Bids dummy is significant in two of the models, and has the anticipated 
negative sign.  Therefore, if no bids were achieved at auction it reduced the likelihood 
of a subsequent negotiated sale. The other coefficients that report significant results 
from the probit are those relating to the year dummies. The dummy for 1998 is 
significant in each specification, as are those for 1999 and 2001 in Model I. This is 
very likely due to the strong market conditions during this period.  
 
The results also show that the Reserve Price has a significant negative impact in the 
third specification. This may be reflecting an over-valuation of the property that, 
despite the failure to sell at auction, continues into the subsequent private 
negotiations. However, this result needs to be viewed also in the context of the 
significant positive coefficient relating to the New Guide-to-Old Guide premium in 
the second model.  This would imply that if the guide price was revised upwards 
following the auction, it significantly increased the probability of a subsequent sale. 
While this may appear counter intuitive, two issues arising from this finding.  The 
first issue is that any upward movement in the guide following the auction may reflect 
an indication of demand for the property amongst potential buyers, even if this 
demand did not result in a successful sale. Secondly, it needs to be remembered that 
the initial guide price was originally set with an eye towards an auction sale with the 
aim of encouraging participation in the auction. Therefore, an increase in the guide 
price after withdrawal at auction may be a reflection of a more realistic assessment of 
the value of the property. This can be illustrated by looking at the average figures 
from the raw data where the withdrawn sample had an average initial guide price of 
€487,584 whilst the average revised, post auction, guide price increases to €509,410. 
Out of 190 observations, 86 properties see an upwards adjustment, only 4 see a 
reduction, and the remainder see no change. If you constrain the sample to only those 
properties where the reserve prices are available, the situation becomes clearer. With 
88 properties in the sample where reserve prices are available and the properties were 
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subsequently withdrawn, the average initial guide is €423,864, rising to €453,205 post 
auction.  Again in the majority of cases the guide was adjusted upwards (52 cases) 
with only one example of a downward adjustment. However, the average reserve 
price of the 88 properties was €478,807. Therefore, while a property may have seen 
its guide increased, it was still on average less than the reserve. Indeed, the average 
percentage difference between the revised guide and the reserve is -4.31%. Hence, 
whilst the guide has been adjusted upwards this is perhaps reflective of an admission 
that the initial guide was not a true indication of the underlying value. The fact that on 
average the revised guide is less than the reserve shows the impact of a failure to sell 
and the use of a perhaps more realistic assessment for subsequent negotiations.  
 
Table 4 presents the final set of empirical findings which relate the analysis of the sale 
premiums achieved in the case of the withdrawn properties. The dependent variable is 
the percentage premium of the achieved sale price relative to the opening bid, guide 
price and reserve respectively12. The primary issue of note in these results relates to 
the renewed importance of the auction process with respect to participation. The 
Number of Bidders is significant in two of the three specifications, whilst Auction 
Attendance and the Number of Bids are significant in one model each. These findings 
highlight the importance of the auction process, in terms of encouraging interest and 
participation and are in line with the findings of Ong (2006). However, the findings 
do have to be considered with a degree of caution. It is important to remember that the 
opening bid and the guide price contain information that does not necessarily reflect 
an estimate of market value. Therefore, any discounting of these figures and therefore 
a higher premium does have to be viewed in that light. The result with respect to the 
Reserve Price is however more robust as it should more accurately reflect the agents 
and vendors assessment of market value. Therefore, any significant findings here can 
be viewed, at least with a greater degree of certainty, that the Number of Bids is 
significant in the price achieved post auction.  
 
6: Conclusion 
Existing empirical work that has considered auctions in a property context has largely 
concentrated on the issue of the choice of sale mechanism and whether properties sold 
at auction achieve a different price than those transacted privately. In contrast, few 
studies have considered the issue of whether the auction process impacts upon the sale 
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price achieved by those properties that were initially withdrawn from sale at auction 
and subsequently sold through negotiation. In considering variables that are often 
missing from much of the empirical work on auctions, it was found that the reserve 
price, initial guide prices, and after auction guide prices provide additional price 
information to auction participants. The resultant impact on subsequent sale after 
withdrawal of a property from auction and for price premiums after withdrawal is 
associated with key price variables revealed both prior to and during the auction itself.   
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Tables & Figures 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 Mean Median Number 
Panel A: Overall Sample 
Sale Price 452,034.91 358,000.00 289 
Guide Price 418,542.08 327,500.00 404 
Reserve Price 424,125.00 340,000.00 240 
Withdrawn Price 498,388.24 350,000.00 85 
Number in Attendance 20.37 14.00 404 
Number of Bids 12.32 8.00 404 
Number of Bidders 2.25 2.00 404 
Number of Auctions on Day 2.32 2.00 404 
Time After Auction to Subsequent Sale 9.88 1.00 77 
Bathrooms 1.73 1.50 404 
Bedrooms 3.57 3.00 404 
Notes: Table 1 reports summary statistics for some of the key variables. The summary statistics are 
reported on the basis of the overall sample.  
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Table 2: Sale Mechanism Tests 
 Guide Prices Sale Prices 
Constant 
11.7187 
(78.3962***) 
11.8826 
(73.8596***) 
Sold at Auction Dummy 
-0.1097 
(-2.1786**) 
0.0608 
(1.1218) 
Sold Prior Dummy 
0.0019 
(0.0176) 
0.0515 
(0.4463) 
Bathrooms 
0.2556 
(4.2901***) 
0.2279 
(3.5538***) 
Bedrooms 
0.6124 
(6.6795***) 
0.5577 
(5.6521***) 
Parking 
0.0739 
(1.4682) 
0.0593 
(1.0940) 
Apartment 
0.1420 
(1.2836) 
0.1633 
(1.3710) 
Terrace/Mews 
0.0006 
(0.0084) 
-0.0407 
(-0.5110) 
Semi-Detached 
-0.0096 
(-0.1331) 
-0.0293 
(-0.3790) 
Detached 
0.3232 
(4.4807***) 
0.2850 
(3.6701***) 
Central Dublin 
0.0898 
(0.8314) 
0.0632 
(0.5435) 
South City 
0.2019 
(2.7879***) 
0.2206 
(2.8310***) 
South County Dublin 
0.1860 
(2.4525**) 
0.1998 
(2.4478**) 
Periphery 
0.0824 
(0.7799) 
0.0471 
(0.4140) 
1998 
-0.3312 
(-4.7087***) 
-0.3108 
(-4.1048***) 
1999 
-0.1786 
(-2.3603**) 
-0.1137 
(-1.3968) 
2001 
0.3637 
(3.5827***) 
0.3623 
(3.3161***) 
2002 
0.4184 
(4.1576***) 
0.4854 
(4.4808***) 
R2 adjusted 0.5780 0.5116 
Observations 289 289 
Notes: Table 2 reports the coefficients estimated from a log hedonic model using Sale and Guide Prices 
as the dependent variables. * indicates significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
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Table 3: Probit Models Examining the Probability of Sale of Withdrawn Properties 
 Model I Model II Model III 
 Coefficient Standard 
Error 
T Statistic Coefficient Standard 
Error 
T Statistic Coefficient Standard 
Error 
T Statistic 
Constant -0.5082 0.7513 -0.6764 1.1998 1.2909 0.9294 3.8125 1.8028 2.1148** 
Bathrooms -0.2130 0.1702 -1.2519 -0.1900 0.2820 -0.6736 -0.0438 0.0871 -0.5036 
Bedrooms -0.0593 0.1404 -0.4222 -0.3204 0.2544 -1.2595 -0.0015 0.0864 -0.0169 
Parking -0.0665 0.2527 -0.2632 -0.9375 0.4559 -2.0565** -0.2393 0.1353 -1.7688* 
Apartment 0.0790 0.561 0.1408 0.1118 1.3551 0.0825 0.1133 0.2995 0.3782 
Terrace/Mews -0.2066 0.3866 -0.5345 -0.3412 0.6539 -0.5219 0.0115 0.1802 0.0640 
Semi-Detached -0.2597 0.4000 -0.6493 0.0108 0.6264 0.0172 0.0552 0.1845 0.2989 
Detached -0.1464 0.3509 -0.4173 -0.1424 0.6478 -0.2200 0.1201 0.1871 0.6421 
Central Dublin 0.9068 0.5852 1.5495 1.0040 1.1274 0.8905 0.0507 0.3102 0.1633 
South City 0.5240 0.3978 1.3173 0.2235 0.6283 0.3558 0.0273 0.1818 0.1501 
South County Dublin 0.4158 0.3952 1.0523 -0.0933 0.6679 -0.1397 -0.0526 0.1921 -0.2739 
Periphery 0.3193 0.5103 0.6258 0.0235 0.9363 0.0251 0.0568 0.2703 0.2101 
1998 1.5586 0.3499 4.4539*** 2.2090 0.7500 2.9454*** 0.4580 0.1815 2.5230** 
1999 0.9531 0.3495 2.7267*** 0.9884 0.7231 1.3700 0.2410 0.1740 1.3856 
2001 0.7615 0.4061 1.8753* 0.9020 1.0132 0.8903 0.2032 0.2475 0.8212 
2002 -0.7513 0.7838 -0.9585 0.0549 1.9018 0.0289 0.1169 0.3604 0.3243 
Auction Attendance 0.0025 0.0083 0.3051 0.0044 0.0160 0.2724 -0.0012 0.0041 -0.3037 
Number of Bidders 0.1654 0.2847 0.5811 0.4309 0.3908 1.1026 0.0274 0.1087 0.2524 
Number of Bids 0.0049 0.0460 0.1060 -0.0282 0.0633 -0.4458 0.0018 0.0172 0.1022 
Multiple Auctions -0.4421 0.3052 -1.4486 -0.8268 0.5760 -1.4354 -0.1214 0.1681 -0.7224 
No Bids -0.6345 0.3849 -1.6485* -1.0280 0.5870 -1.7513* -0.2506 0.1625 -1.5422 
Order of Auction 0.2202 0.2825 0.7795 0.4990 0.4607 1.0832 -0.0035 0.1288 -0.0272 
New Guide-Guide (%) 1.3031 1.2018 1.0843 - - - - - - 
New Guide-Reserve (%) - - - 6.3389 3.1271 2.0271** - - - 
Reserve Price - - - - - - -0.2573 0.1523 -1.6895* 
McFadden R2  0.2500   0.3664   0.3938   
Observations 190   88   89   
Notes: Three alternative specifications of a Binary Probit model are estimated on those properties that were withdrawn at auction. The dependent variable in a binary variable which takes the 
value of unity if the property sold following the auction and zero if it remained unsold. * indicates significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
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Table 4: Sale Premiums on Withdrawn Properties 
 Sale-Open Bid (%) Sale-Guide (%) Sale-Reserve (%) 
Constant 0.2157 (0.1821) 
-0.0855 
(0.1104) 
-0.0221 
(0.0517) 
Auction Attendance 0.0002 (0.0018) 
0.0022 
(0.0011)* 
0.0007 
(0.0006) 
Number of Bidders 0.0881 (0.0417)** 
0.0726 
(0.0291)** 
-0.0138 
(0.0127) 
Number of Bids -0.0018 (0.0069) 
-0.0012 
(0.0049) 
0.0047 
(0.0021)** 
Multiple Auctions 0.0055 (0.0654) 
-0.0741 
(0.0391)* 
-0.0120 
(0.0201) 
No Bids - 0.1103 (0.0471)** 
0.0001 
(0.0220) 
Previous Auction Sold 0.0425 (0.1008) 
-0.0248 
(0.0542) 
-0.0264 
(0.0258) 
Order of Auction -0.0654 (0.1046) 
0.0663 
(0.0510) 
0.0138 
(0.0254) 
R2 adjusted 0.0879 0.2119 0.3855 
Observations 48 77 45 
Notes: Three alternative OLS models are estimated with the percentage change of the sale price over 
the opening bid, guide and reserve price. The sample is constrained to just consider those properties 
that were withdrawn at auction. The full results including the property specific variables are available 
from the authors. The figures in parentheses are standard errors. * indicates significance at 10%, ** at 
5% and *** at 1%. 
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Endnotes: 
                                                 
1 The current market conditions in Ireland are obviously different from those prevailing 
during the sample. More recently auctions have been used more frequently in the context of 
distressed/foreclosed sales with also a larger number of properties offered at one auction. 
2 See also papers such as Harris & Raviv (1981), McAfee & McMillan (1988) and Campbell 
& Levin (2006).  
3 The role of the number of bidders in obtaining higher prices at auction is shown in 
theoretical papers such as Vickery (1961), Holt (1979), Harris & Raviv (1981) and McAfee & 
McMillan (1987).  
4 Pesendorfer & Swinkels (2000) note that a large number of bidders can lead to a resumption 
of efficiency, even in the case of a two-signal auction. 
5 On a more general note Chow et al. (2010) also support the previously cited work relating to 
the importance of market conditions and that auctions are more likely to outperform during 
periods of strong house price appreciation. 
6 The arguments laid out by Quan (2002) can also be assessed in this context. Quan (2002) 
illustrates that bidders with higher search costs will tend to participate in auctions. Properties 
at the premium end of the market would fit this description. Quan (2002) also provides 
evidence that the price obtained should be enhanced in an auction context.  
7 In markets such as the United States and also Singapore where a large proportion of auctions 
involve distressed sales the situation may be quite different. As Ong et al. (2005) note the 
sellers of distressed properties may be more willing to sell quickly and at a discounted price 
in order to recoup some of their investment. In contrast willing sellers will be less willing to 
either sell quickly or at a discount. If an auction market, such as Ireland, is dominated by 
willing sellers then this does make a distinct difference based on the nature of the sellers 
concerned and a possible reduced likelihood of an auction discount being observed, 
particularly during strong housing market conditions.  
8 It should be noted that the Milgrom & Weber (1982) model that shows the preference over 
sealed bids is illustrated in the case of ‘irrevocable exit’, whereby bidders who withdraw from 
the auction cannot subsequently re-enter. Sealed bid auctions will maximize revenue in the 
case of independent bids and risk-averse bidders. 
9 Under an assumption of independent private values this therefore reverts to the Vickery 
(1961) structure whereby the good is purchased by the bidder who has the highest private 
value.  
10 Part of the conditions agreed to when obtaining the data was that the auction house remain 
anonymous. Furthermore, the sensitive nature of the data meant that no data after 2002 was 
released. 
11 An earlier version of this paper took the more conventional route and excluded the 1998 
dummy from the models. However, given the strong upward movement in the market this 
resulted in all of the included time dummies being positive and significant. This did lead to 
some confusion when the earlier version of the paper was presented. The choice of excluded 
dummy is arbitrary and does not impact on the coefficients for other variables, therefore to 
avoid potential mis-understandings we re-ran the analysis with 2000 excluded. The original 
results are available from the authors on request. 
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12 For the sake of brevity Table 4 only reports the coefficients for those variables directly 
related to the auction process. However, the models did include all of the property specific 
control variables incorporated into the previous models. The full results are available from the 
authors on request. As would be expected given the nature of the tests, the control variables 
were largely insignificant. Indeed, only one variable was found to be significant at 
conventional. This case was for the Central City location dummy in the Sale-Reserve 
specification when it was noted as being significantly negative.  
